A 'Multiple Lenses' Approach to Policy Change: the Case of Tobacco Policy in the UK by Cairney, Paul
 1 
A ‘Multiple Lenses’ Approach to Policy Change: the Case of 
Tobacco Policy in the UK 
 
Paul Cairney  
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen, 
AB243QY paul.cairney@abdn.ac.uk 
 
This article examines a period of rapid policy change following decades of stability in 
UK tobacco.  It seeks to account for such a long period of policy stability, analyse and 
qualify the extent of change, and explain change using a ‘multiple lenses’ approach.  
It compares the explanatory value of policy network models such as punctuated 
equilibrium and the advocacy coalition framework, with models stressing change 
from ‘above and below’ such as multi-level governance and policy transfer.  A key 
finding is that the value of these models varies according to the narrative of policy 
change that we select.  The article challenges researchers to be careful about assuming 
the nature of policy change before embarking on explanation.  While the findings of 
the case study may vary with other policy areas in British politics, the call for clarity, 
and lessons from multiple approaches, are widely applicable.  
 
Keywords: Tobacco policy; advocacy coalitions; punctuated equilibrium; multi-level 
governance; policy transfer; multiple streams 
 
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in British 
Politics. The definitive publisher-authenticated version British Politics (2007) 2, 
45–68 is available online at: http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/bp/journal/v2/n1/abs/4200039a.html 
 
 2 
Introduction
1
 
Tobacco policy in the UK appears to have gone through a period of rapid change 
following decades of stability.  In 2002 Westminster passed a bill banning tobacco 
advertising throughout the UK.  In 2006 it passed a bill banning smoking 
comprehensively in enclosed public places in England.  Similar decisions were made 
in Wales and Northern Ireland, while the Scottish Parliament was the first to legislate 
in 2005 (Cairney, forthcoming 2007).  This, combined with measures such as 
smoking cessation and health education, now makes the UK the most progressive 
member state in the EU (see Joosens and Raw, 2006).  Yet for most of the post-war 
period tobacco policy was marked by stability.  Tobacco control measures were 
voluntary rather than legislative, while public health arguments often came second-
best to those based on individual choice and the economic benefits of tobacco. 
 
The aim of this article is to critically analyse these developments: to account for such 
stability; to analyse the extent of change; and, to explain these events using models of 
policy change.  Of particular relevance are the advocacy coalition framework and 
punctuated equilibrium which seek to explain sudden change despite the presence of 
powerful policy networks.   Other models – including policy transfer and multi-level 
governance – aid explanation by focussing on activity ‘above and below’ the UK, 
while multiple streams analysis points to idiosyncratic elements of change.   
 
However, the article does not seek to confirm the value of one particular model.  
Rather, it constructs three arguments drawing on the idea of ‘narratives’ of policy 
explanation (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2003).  First, apparent change does not mean 
actual change.  The article challenges researchers to be careful about assuming the 
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scope and nature of policy change before embarking on explanation.  The discussion 
of measurement, and the development of two narratives, shows the level of 
competition to define the scope and nature of policy change.  Second, the selection of 
one narrative at the expense of another determines the value of these models.  For 
example, models describing ‘external’ factors have more value if we demonstrate 
‘internal’ inertia based on policy network dominance.  If, instead, the network was 
open and conducive to long-term policy change then external influence is less 
impressive.   Third, the ‘multiple lenses’ approach gives a more complete explanation 
of policy change.  The article employs each model as a tool, to make them work for 
the case study rather than vice versa.  As Allison (1969: 715-6) argues, the fact that 
different analysts relying on different models produce different explanations suggests 
the need for introspection.   Policy analysts face the same problems as ‘rational’ 
decision-makers: an infinite wealth of potentially relevant information to choose from 
but finite resources with which to choose.  As a result they focus their attention to one 
particular aspect of explanation.  Employing more than one model does not solve this 
problem but it does highlight a series of perspectives through which to view the same 
phenomenon.     
 
The article concludes with a discussion of generalisability.  It suggests that while UK 
tobacco policy is broadly consistent with international policy change, the results are at 
variance with much of what we know about British politics.
 
 However, the same can 
be said for most case studies.  Policy outcomes vary by the stage of the policy cycle, 
level of government and policy sector.  Policy analysis is therefore devoted to 
juggling parsimonious explanation with the acknowledgement of complexity.  This 
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article addresses both concerns by applying a multiple lenses approach to detailed 
case study analysis.   
 
Policy Stability: A Smoking Policy Community? 
Stability came from an insulated industry-government relationship underpinned by 
socio-economic conditions.  However, the value of tobacco to government varies by 
source. For example, Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) estimates 40000 direct 
and indirect jobs in 1979 while the Tobacco Advisory Council (TAC) suggests 
300,000, with many in economically depressed and/ or marginal constituencies 
(Taylor, 1984: 69).  In 1981 £4 billion was raised in taxes (equivalent in cash to the 
£9.3 billion raised in 2003), tobacco was a successful industrial export, the prevalence 
of smoking was high (51% of men and 41% of women in 1974), and tobacco control 
was seen as a vote loser by politicians (Baggott, 1988; ASH, 2005a).  This underpins 
Read’s (1992) identification of a producer dominated policy network.  The practical 
basis for dominance was the long-term relationship between the industry and 
government, cemented during World War Two when TAC’s predecessors2 were set 
up to ensure the supply of cigarettes.  TAC represented the 4 main domestic tobacco 
companies and could claim high representational legitimacy.  Direct TAC lobbying to 
senior ministers was supplemented by support from sports and arts ministers (because 
of the level of sponsorship) and MPs acting as tobacco consultants or from 
constituencies with a strong tobacco presence (Taylor, 1984: 69-71).  It enjoyed close 
relationships with senior civil servants in the Treasury and Department of Trade and 
Industry as well as day-to-day links at a lower level of government (for example, 
when negotiating the details of voluntary agreements).  It was joined by organisations 
representing tobacco workers (e.g. the Tobacco Workers Union), retailers and even 
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consumers (FOREST - Freedom Organisation for the Right to Enjoy Smoking 
Tobacco), giving the tobacco lobby ‘the appearance of a broad constituency of 
support’ but with TAC as the main voice to minimise the appearance of fragmentation 
(Baggott, 1988: 18).  Newspaper advertising revenue [£17m in 1981 (or £39m in 
2006) – Taylor, 1984: 49] ensured that few anti-smoking stories were published, and 
TAC had a close relationship with the (self-regulating) Advertising Authority which 
feared that a ban would set a costly precedent (Baggott, 1988: 21).   
 
Read (1992) suggests that this policy monopoly was surrounded by an issue network.  
In the 1950s and 1960s this included the Royal College of Physicians (RCP), followed 
in the 1970s by ASH and the British Medical Association (BMA).  While the tobacco 
industry often engaged in debates within the wider issue network (calling on 
FOREST, the retailers or unions), public health interests were excluded from the core 
network.  Compared to the present day, ASH was not well funded, the BMA was not 
well organised, and cancer charities were not active (Baggott, 1988: 15).  The anti-
tobacco campaign was still in its infancy by the 1970s and ASH could not be too 
critical of a government providing 95% of its income (Taylor, 1984: 43).  As a result, 
tobacco companies controlled the policy image of tobacco.  The framing of tobacco as 
an economic issue – jobs, tax revenue, exports – was the basis for support from the 
Treasury, DTI and Department of Employment.  Further, framing the issue as a matter 
of individual choice explained why increasingly accepted links between smoking and 
illness did not result in significant policy change. 
 
Measuring Policy Change 
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Recent tobacco legislation therefore appears to mark a symbolic and substantive shift 
from the past, but how do we demonstrate or qualify this?  We situate these new 
regulations within a wider discussion of tobacco policy instruments and use these 
categories to examine policy change over an extended period.  The exercise suggests 
that accounts of change are intertwined with normative issues (how much change 
there should be) as well as competing narratives on the role and intentions of 
government.  Adapting and extending Studlar (2004: 191) we have eight relevant 
policy instruments: 
 
1. Regulation – on advertising, smoking in public places, sales of cigarettes and 
levels of tar.  
2. Economic incentives (subsidies to farmers, tax expenditure on arts 
sponsorship) and penalties (taxation, litigation). 
3. Public education – including the ratio of health education to tobacco 
advertising. 
4. Smoking cessation services and nicotine replacement therapy. 
5. Funding external organisations (such as ASH).   
6. Funding scientific research (through the Medical Research Council). 
7. Tackling tobacco smuggling. 
8. Levels of enforcement and the scale of punishment.  This is particularly 
relevant to the history of voluntary agreements. 
 
The point of identifying a range of policy instruments is that a focus on regulation 
alone exaggerates policy change.   Looking at other measures also helps us 
characterise the trajectory of change – for example, the argument (below) that recent 
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legislation marks an incremental step rather than sea change draws on the evidence of 
complementary policy measures. 
 
Narratives of Policy Change 
Interviews suggest a fundamental disagreement on what recent events represent – do 
they demonstrate successful pressure on a government reluctant to legislate and 
challenge tobacco interests, or reflect a logical progression from incremental steps 
already taken by government?   Table 1 highlights this scope for different 
explanations by comparing two narratives of post-war policy change.  While the 
dominance narrative points to a closed policy community ensuring policy stability 
(even following Labour’s election in 1997), the incremental narrative suggests a 
relatively open network which was more conducive to policy change. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Three main points support an incremental policy change narrative.  First, there is 
evidence of a gradual move towards restrictive smoking policies from the early 20
th
 
century to the 1970s.  ASH (2005c) suggests that: bans on sales of tobacco to children 
(under 16) were introduced in 1908 and extended in 1933; the first smoking 
withdrawal clinic was established in 1958; cigarette advertising on TV was banned in 
1965; the first voluntary agreement with the industry on advertising and health 
warnings on packs was in 1971; and smoking was phased out in public transport and 
cinemas from the 1970s.  Tax increases on tobacco justified on health grounds were 
used extensively in the 1970s (Read, 1996: 70).  The nature of health education also 
shifted, from ‘stating the facts’ and letting individuals decide in the 1950s, harm 
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reduction (promoting ‘low tar’ cigarettes) in the 1960s, to absolutism (there is no safe 
level of tobacco smoking) in the 1970s.  Health education on tobacco increased from 
£414,000 in 1973 (the cash equivalent of £3m in 2006) to £2 million (£4.6m) in 1981 
(Berridge and Loughlin, 2005, 960; Taylor, 1984).   
 
Second, Baggott (1988: 44-5) highlights a ‘hardening of the official stance’ in the 
1980s, with more restrictive controls on voluntary advertising, stronger government 
health warnings, a bill tightening the law on sales of tobacco to children
3
 and taxation 
to discourage smoking in the 1984 and 1986 budgets.  Voluntary agreements 
indicated, ‘a change in the relationship between government departments and the 
tobacco industry’, providing benchmarks to assess compliance and signalling the 
inevitability of legislation (Read, 1996: 36; 54).  Third, the election of a Labour 
Government in 1997 marked a further advance.   Tobacco control became a key part 
of its public health campaign following the publication of Smoking Kills (Cm 4177, 
1998).  This promised to implement the EU directive on tobacco advertising, increase 
spending on health education and smoking cessation services, combine increased 
taxation on tobacco with better customs controls, toughen the code of practice on 
smoking at work and address smoking in public places with the voluntary Public 
Places Charter.    
 
A review of tobacco control policies in 30 European countries (by the European 
Network for Smoking Prevention) suggests that the UK already has the second best 
record (Joosens and Raw, 2006).  Restrictions on smoking public places will elevate 
the UK to the top.  The White Paper Choosing Health already proposed to do this, by 
legislating to phase out smoking in the workplace by 2007, with the exception of 
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private clubs and bars not serving food (Cm 6374, 2004: 97-9).  On this basis, the 
government argument is five-fold.  First, the levels of tax on tobacco have peaked, 
given the threat of smuggling.  Second, policy could not get ahead of the scientific 
evidence which did not set the effects of passive smoking in stone until the Scientific 
Committee on Tobacco and Health (SCOTH) report in 1998.  Third, the approach has 
been deliberately incremental, with measures to influence but not get ahead of public 
opinion.  The voluntary approach is tried, evaluated, and then replaced by legislation 
if not working.  Fourth, the voluntary approach was working in many areas.  By 2004, 
50% of workplaces were smoke-free, 36% had designated smoking areas and 10% 
involved people working outdoors.  Excellent progress was also made on meeting 
smoke-free targets in restaurants.  Finally, until recently, public health groups agreed 
with the need for incremental change.  Therefore the recent comprehensive ban is a 
surprising addition to, but logical progression of, government policy (interviews, 
Department of Health, 2006).  
 
This narrative suggests that the policy network was never as closed as Read (1992) 
suggests.  Scientific and medical advice was always present and ASH was a 
government-funded pressure group whose role was fostered by civil servants. Its 
exclusion from formal negotiations with government was caused by its unwillingness 
to work with tobacco companies (Berridge 1999: 1188).   Further, what looked like 
government inactivity due to industry dominance was often a failure to accept 
epidemiological evidence or an unwillingness to risk the electoral fallout of 
legislation (Berridge, 2004: 119).   The public health stance was eventually successful 
in changing demand for tobacco and attitudes towards policy.  The constant 
production of evidence on illness, demands of ASH and introduction of MP bills were 
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used by government as leverage in negotiations with the industry.  ASH’s lack of 
formal contact also contrasted with its work behind the scenes with the Treasury 
(Read, 1996: 120), while DTI attitudes varied by minister (Berridge, 2004: 119). 
 
The alternative ‘dominance’ narrative characterises UK policy as a series of minimal 
responses to public health pressure.  From 1956-9 the Ministry of Health spent less 
than £5000 (£70,000 in 2006 terms) on anti-smoking messages compared to £27 
million (£376m) of tobacco advertising (Taylor, 1984: 5).   The demands from 
government on the industry were light, with the use of filter tips in cigarettes and 
funding to the Medical Research Council (£250,000, or £3.5m in 2006) the most 
significant (Read, 1996: 43).  Although epidemiological proof of the link between 
smoking and illness was accepted by government in the 1960s, any policy change still 
required chief medical officers and health ministers working together. So, while 
George Godber (CMO from 1960-72) encouraged the RCP to publish reports on the 
links between smoking and health, the results were not seen as reason enough to 
legislate to restrict advertising by Health Minister Enoch Powell (Taylor, 1984: 7).   
The ‘worst blows’ to tobacco in the 1960s were health warnings on cigarette packs 
and a ban on TV advertising (1984: 7).  Yet, the former helped the industry refute 
legal claims based on ignorance of the health effects of smoking, while the latter 
showed the limits to ministerial action.  The ban was possible because Health Minister 
Kenneth Robinson found an ally in Tony Benn (Postmaster General) who could act 
without legislating – by directing ITV’s advertising watchdog (1984: 82).  The 
industry responded with a gift coupon scheme (which reversed the falling 
consumption of cigarettes) and sports sponsorship (with no health warnings) to 
circumvent the ban and extend the potential to advertise to children (thus undermining 
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other agreements).  More extensive legislation was never achieved.  Richard 
Crossman, as the first Secretary of State of the new Department of Health and Social 
Security in 1968, overruled Robinson by pushing for voluntary agreements over 
legislation.  These were chosen not because they worked but because legislation 
would be unpopular.   Since the threat to legislate had no political weight, there was 
little incentive for tobacco companies to take the agreements seriously.   
 
The most significant progress in the 1970s - on public transport - was caused by 
concerns for safety rather than health (Read, 1996: 7).  The threat of legislation was 
not revisited until 1974 by Health Minister Dr David Owen.  His plan was to classify 
tobacco as a medicine and therefore control its content and promotion.  Yet the lack of 
a working majority in Westminster hindered legislative progress and Owen had 
become Foreign Secretary by the time a majority was achieved (Taylor, 1984: 94).  
Within the post-1979 Thatcher government, Sir George Young was an active but 
junior health minister who moved for a ban on advertising and sports sponsorship.  
This was seen by many Conservative MPs and ministers (including Thatcher) as an 
attack on ‘freedom not cigarettes’.  The proposal was rejected and Young was shunted 
to another department (1984: 145).   
 
The history of voluntary agreements is therefore one of slow movement and limited 
government ‘bite’.  Much policy change was easy for the industry to accept – 
introducing filter tips which helped marketing to women and persuaded some that 
they were smoking safely; stopping advertising on high tar cigarettes which had a low 
and declining market share, and limiting advertising expenditure which suited the 
companies with the highest market shares.  Other measures, such as health warnings 
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on cigarette packs, were traded for the ability to use brand names in advertising 
(Read, 1996: 58).  While advertising expenditure was capped, this was neither policed 
effectively nor matched by health education spending.  Most health ministers used the 
agreements to look like they were acting, with the Treasury on hand to block those 
who tried to go further (1996: 50-4). 
 
Post-war UK policy contrasts with greater advances in the US (Read, 2005) and 
Norway (Baggott, 1988).  Successive measures were incremental but not 
characterised by Lindblom’s ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ since there is dominance by 
one set of interests and the starting point did not represent a negotiated balance 
between industry and health.    The use of voluntary agreements was a victory for the 
tobacco lobby since they ensured its continued access to government and control over 
the level of implementation. After the election of Labour in 1997, the last voluntary 
agreement took 10 years to replace.  In 1999 Labour introduced a new voluntary code 
and, ‘Health bodies were up in arms. All pubs had to do was put a sticker up in the 
window to say it was a smoking pub.  So everyone put up stickers!’ (interview, ASH 
Scotland 2004).
4
  A very small proportion of pubs went smoke-free, while those with 
non-smoking areas relied on ventilation systems that the tobacco industry knew were 
limited (Leavell et al, 2006: 227-8).  
 
Narratives and Models of Policy Change 
The discussion of narratives shows the level of competition to define the nature of 
policy change.  Since both present convincing accounts of policy development, we 
need to be careful about assuming a policy’s history before examining recent events.  
This point is crucial to the explanatory power of models of policy change: their value 
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is inextricably linked to the narrative of policy change that we select.  We can 
demonstrate this in a discussion of two main types of explanation.  The first directs 
attention to influence from ‘above and below’ the UK.  This is most valuable if we 
select the dominance narrative which suggests post-war policy stability and inertia.  
Recent change has been profound and only made possible by a successful challenge to 
existing relationships, helped by events external to the network.   Explanations 
highlighting external influence are less impressive if we select the incremental 
narrative which suggests that recent legislation is a logical progression from existing 
policy with an established trajectory.  This suggests that external influence had little 
effect on policy change.  The second type of explanation uses policy networks 
analysis to account for periods of stability and change.  While the advocacy coalition 
framework can be consistent with both narratives, punctuated equilibrium depends on 
the dominance narrative of policy development. 
 
Policy Change From Above and Below 
UK policy follows the broad trends identified in Studlar’s (2004) analysis of 
developed countries.  Most have advertising bans on TV and radio (with sponsorship 
more difficult to address), cigarette warning labels, health education campaigns since 
the 1960s and taxation since the 1980s.  Full advertising bans and public places have 
only recently become realistic issues.  A common theme is the post-war debate on the 
links between smoking and illness, replaced by more established medical evidence but 
relentless challenges by tobacco to the policy implications (Feldman and Bayer, 2004: 
1).  Responses have varied according to the ‘vested economic interests, cultural 
practices, and political factors’ of each country (Studlar, 2004).  Therefore, we need 
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to dig deeper to find the causal mechanisms involved.  Models stressing influence 
from above-and-below include: 
 
1. Venue shift, in which binding decisions made in venue B affect policy in 
venue A (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 32);  
2. Multi-level governance (MLG) which describes the dispersal of power 
from central government to other levels of government and non-
governmental actors (Bache and Flinders, 2004);   
3. Policy transfer and learning. 
 
These models help us understand the links between decisions made elsewhere and 
their effects on UK policy.  However, the extent of this influence varies and is 
categorised by Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000) discussion of transfer: 
 
 direct coercive transfer which can involve a supra-national body (such as the 
EU) taking over responsibility  for policy development and obliging individual 
countries to follow; 
 indirect coercive transfer which describes a perception within region A that it 
should follow the policy of region B;  
 voluntary transfer which describes the relative freedom to interpret and learn 
from decisions made elsewhere. 
 
Elements of all three are apparent with EU influence on UK tobacco policy (although 
this has yet to extend to public places). This began with the European Commission’s 
Europe Against Cancer campaign and directives banning tobacco advertising on TV, 
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tobacco product labelling, limits on the level of tar in cigarettes and minimum tax 
levels.  The most ambitious initiative was the first Tobacco Advertising Directive 
(TAD1) which banned advertising in the print media, radio and internet as well as in 
cinemas, posters and merchandise-based advertising.  This passed with a narrow 
majority in 1997, but Germany (backed by the tobacco industry) referred the issue to 
the European Court of Justice in 2000 (Duina and Kurzer, 2004: 58).  The ECJ 
repealed the directive but left the door open for a more limited directive covering 
advertising with a cross-border element (TAD2, adopted in 2002).   
 
The effect of this directive on the UK is not straightforward.  There is coercive 
transfer to an extent, with a proxy counterfactual provided by Germany which will 
now implement TAD2 following an unsuccessful appeal.  However, the Labour party 
was already committed to banning tobacco advertising in its 1992 manifesto.
5
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Barron MP attempted to do so in a Private Member’s Bill in 1993.  Although this fell, 
its measures were adopted as Labour policy and included in the 1997 manifesto, with 
Barron appointed as Shadow Public Health Minister.  Further, the 2002 Act 
implements most of the requirements of TAD1 without being required to do so.  Yet, 
Labour’s actions in government differed to its public statements in opposition.   Even 
before the 1997 election, Labour was nervous about the issue of sports sponsorship, 
with shadow ministers pursuing a form of words to ‘get them off the hook’ (interview, 
Labour MP, 2006).  When in government, Barron (who maintained a relatively hard 
line on sponsorship) was passed over for the ministerial post.  The UK then voted 
against TAD2, with some suggestion that this related to a £1 million donation to the 
Labour Party by Formula 1’s Bernie Ecclestone (2004: 70).  The UK government was 
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in no hurry to legislate and the bill followed a convoluted path, proposed in 2000 but 
running out of time before the 2001 dissolution of Parliament (Read, 2005).     
 
This provoked a response from ‘below’, with the new legislative powers granted to 
Scotland demonstrating the potential for venue shift as a means of exerting pressure 
on UK policy.  Originally the UK bill was to cover Scotland, but when it fell Nicola 
Sturgeon MSP introduced a separate (more limited) Scottish Member’s Bill. This was 
debated in the Scottish Parliament throughout 2002, but then withdrawn in favour of a 
single UK Act.  Given the uncertainty over Scottish competence in this area, the 
Scottish Bill was used primarily for agenda-setting, with MSPs lobbying their MP 
counterparts on the issue (Cairney, forthcoming 2007).  Stronger Scottish influence is 
apparent with smoking in public places.  In 2005, Scottish Executive legislation 
marked a clear departure from the UK voluntary approach.  This was subsequently 
used by public health groups in the UK as leverage for change (interviews with ASH, 
BMA, CIEH, 2006).  Much was made of England appearing to fall behind Scotland 
(with Wales and Northern Ireland signalling similar intentions), particularly since 
Scotland’s implementation date coincided with the vote in Westminster.  Therefore in 
both examples we see the potential for influential venue shift afforded by multi-level 
governance arrangements.   
 
But what is the upshot of this influence?  The dominance narrative suggests that with 
advertising we see a significant impetus to act from above and below, and with public 
places we see pressure based on embarrassment.  Yet, the UK government introduced 
legislation on advertising beyond the minimum requirements of the EU.  Scotland was 
not the only source of pressure and interviews with MPs suggest that Sturgeon’s bill 
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barely registered in Westminster.  House of Commons and Lords pressure, combined 
with the embarrassment of the Ecclestone affair, prompted the government to act.  
Similarly, the UK government had chosen not to follow Scotland with a 
comprehensive ban on smoking in public places and this point was made forcefully by 
Health Secretary John Reid to Scotland’s First Minister (‘McConnell in Smoke-free 
Isolation’, The Scotsman, 29.9.04).  The Department of Health view (interview, 2006) 
was that international policy change was incremental.  Bars and clubs were left to last, 
but clearly isolated until public opinion was conducive to this final change. A quicker 
path chosen by Ireland and followed by Scotland was not the accepted model.  Reid’s 
actions demonstrated that the UK government could voluntarily choose from two 
policy learning options.  It chose to follow the international experience closest to its 
existing (incremental) policy.  Therefore, external venue shift alone does not fully 
explain policy change on smoking in public places. 
 
Policy Networks and External Factors 
A key concern of policy networks analysis is the relationship between ‘internal’ 
explanations for policy stability and ‘external’ reasons for policy change (Marsh and 
Rhodes, 1992: 260-1).  External factors may include: 
 
1. Ideological change following the election of a new government. 
2. Change from ‘above and below’. 
3. Changing information, including medical evidence and the experience of 
international policy change. 
4. The changing economic benefits of tobacco: 
  Jobs in the UK fell from 40000 in 1979 to 11000 in 2003 (ASH, 2005a).    
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 Tobacco tax in 1996 was one-quarter of the value in 1950 (as a proportion of 
total revenue - Berridge, 2004: 130). 
 Rising imported and illegally imported market shares.  Before the 1980s 
almost all tobacco consumed in the UK was from a domestic source, meaning 
that UK tobacco consumption supported UK employment (Baggott, 1988: 45) 
5.  Social change: 
 The drop in smoking prevalence from 51% of men and 41% of women in 1974 
to 28% of men and 24% of women in 2005 (ASH, 2005a).   
 Changing public attitudes: those in favour of smoking restrictions in pubs rose 
from 48% in 1996 to 50% in 2000 and 65% in 2004.
6
 
 
The key is to show that these factors influence the direction of policy but do not 
determine it.  The common element is mediation - the weight or interpretations placed 
on these factors by decision makers and pressure participants.   
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The ACF focuses on sectoral level subsystems which include more actors than policy 
communities: ‘not only interest group leaders, but also agency officials, legislators 
from multiple levels of government, applied researchers, and perhaps even a few 
journalists’ (Sabatier, 1998: 103; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).  The glue that 
binds actors within competing coalitions is ‘belief systems’.  These range from ‘core’ 
beliefs (e.g. the relative priorities of freedom and health), ‘policy core’ (the proper 
scope of government) and secondary aspects (the best way to deliver policy).  Core 
values are the least susceptible to change – ‘akin to a religious conversion’ (1993: 
221) - while policy beliefs may only change following external ‘shocks’ to the 
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subsystem (such as changing socio-economic conditions).  Secondary aspects are 
more subject to change following policy-learning (such as environmental policy 
shifting from command-and-control to economic incentives).  These beliefs are 
refined according to new information and the ‘enlightenment function’ of policy 
analysts.  Advocacy coalitions not only compete for position within subsystems (with 
a role for a neutral ‘policy broker’) but also revise their strategic positions based on 
new evidence and the need to react to external events.  We therefore have stable and 
dynamic elements.  Stability comes from the parameters of policy – the constitutional 
structure, fundamental social structures and values – and perhaps dominance by one 
coalition.  Change comes from reactions to external events (which may undermine 
dominance) and the assimilation of new evidence (mediated by existing beliefs).   
 
The ACF replaces the idea of a producer network within an issue network.  Rather, 
we have pro- and anti-tobacco coalitions.   While pro-tobacco dominated the post-war 
period it still engaged with anti-tobacco in competition to interpret information and 
seek favour from the policy broker.  There was no ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ in the 
early post-war period.  Rather, adjustment (or policy learning) is made by a dominant 
coalition in the face of changing information and external environments.   More 
significant policy change comes from external shocks to the system – a new 
government with different ideas, increasing EU influence, or shifting public opinion.  
These shocks are mediated, with the pro-tobacco coalition adapting (or learning) to 
maintain its dominant position – introducing filters for cigarettes, funding medical 
research, voluntarily restricting advertising and providing ventilation in public places.  
So, while the anti-tobacco coalition may now dominate the subsystem, the value of 
ACF is in explaining why such a shift took so long.  Much of the delay was achieved 
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through the constant re-appraisal of new evidence, from the post-war rejection of the 
scientific evidence on illness, to more recent scepticism about the level of risk from 
passive smoking and what constitutes a proportionate response. 
 
However, there are problems with this interpretation.  First, the ACF explains stability 
better than change.  Policy change of any magnitude tends to be explained by external 
shocks rather than the coalitions themselves (John, 1999; Cairney, 1997).   Second, 
the framework struggles to explain temporary alliances based on self-interest rather 
than core beliefs.  For example, the licensed trade was pro-tobacco until 2005 since a 
smoking ban would harm business.  When the government proposed to ban smoking 
in pubs but exempt ‘private clubs’, the British Beer and Pub Association joined the 
lobby for a comprehensive ban.  Its interests were served at different times by 
different coalitions.  Similarly, while civil liberty groups may join the pro-tobacco 
coalition on the basis of core beliefs (a limited role for the state) there is no 
demonstration that tobacco companies are driven by these beliefs.  Indeed, a 
traditional criticism by domestic tobacco was that government action was not 
extensive enough (on import duty and customs).  The situation of government 
departments is more problematic.  We have two possibilities: first, the Treasury was 
pro-tobacco and the Department of Health anti-tobacco.  Yet the Treasury’s driver for 
rejecting tobacco regulation in the past (lost revenue) does not fit in with the policy 
core beliefs of the pro-tobacco coalition any more than the tobacco companies’.  Or, 
government departments perform the policy broker role.  This fits with the 
Department of Health’s role in negotiating voluntary agreements.  Yet, health 
ministers were often constrained by more powerful departments and excluded from 
the core network (Read, 1992).  This suggests that policy brokerage - a benign 
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concept within the ACF – is more important to the success of coalitions than their 
own strategies.  Finally, since the coalitions are broad it is difficult to track the 
significance of venue shift.  Within the ACF the constitutional structure represents 
stability.  However, the evidence from MLG is that the constraints provided by 
constitutional structures are fluid, providing more change than stability.   
 
Punctuated Equilibrium 
The focus of punctuated equilibrium is to explain long periods of policy stability 
punctuated by short but intense periods of change.  Baumgartner and Jones (1993) 
suggest that since decision makers, the media and the public all have limited resources 
(time, knowledge, attention) they cannot deal with the full range of ideas or policy 
problems.  So they ignore most and promote few to the top of their agenda.  Resource 
constraints also limit attention to certain aspects of a policy problem.  Problem 
definition is crucial since it determines the level of attention and the nature of 
government response.  This process explains tobacco policy monopolies and the 
ability to challenge them.  Tobacco companies pursue the definition of a policy 
problem (or its policy image) as a boost to the economy.  This limits the number of 
participants who can claim a legitimate role in supporting policy.   Those excluded 
from monopolies have an interest in challenging this image.  The role of new ideas 
(such as passive smoking) or new evidence (such as the experience of Ireland) is 
crucial, to divert attention to other aspects of the same problem.  For example, if the 
scientific evidence associates smoking with ill health and attention shifts to 
minimising harm, the decision-making process widens to accommodate new experts.  
If this new image is stifled by policy monopolies, then groups pursue ‘aggressive 
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venue-shopping’ to seek influential audiences elsewhere (the courts, other types of 
government, the media, the public - Jones and Baumgartner, 2005: 5). 
 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 93) describe this process in the US.  In the early 20
th
 
century tobacco attracted minimal media attention and most government attention was 
favourable.  Tobacco enjoyed a glamorous image and consumption was high.  
However, since the 1960s we have seen heightened and negative media coverage and 
a drop in cigarette consumption.  This negative attention causes a reappraisal of the 
positive aspects – for example, the economic benefits are undermined by a focus on 
rising health insurance and decreasing worker productivity (1993: 114).  Similar shifts 
of media attention, smoking prevalence and public attitudes are apparent in the UK, 
reflecting increased acceptance of the scientific evidence linking smoking (and then 
passive smoking) to illness.  Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 87; Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2005) suggest that there is a direct causal link between this type of 
attention and rapid policy change.  Peak periods of organisation change, ‘generally 
coincided with Gallup Poll data showing public concern with the same problems’.   
 
However, this demonstration of cause is problematic.  First, while the US displayed 
high and negative levels of attention and possessed the most organised public health 
lobby, the federal response to tobacco has rarely been as intense.  Before the 1990s, 
most policy progress was achieved through the courts or devolved levels of 
government (Studlar, 2002).  In the UK, fewer influential venues were apparent 
before the late 1990s and even now their influence is uncertain (particularly since 
devolved policy differences are more constrained within a unitary state - Cairney, 
forthcoming 2006).  Second, there is no demonstration that public and media attention 
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determines the nature or intensity of governmental response.   A discussion of 
narratives reinforces this point.     The dominance narrative suggests that the post-war 
policy response was to minimise wider demands for change.  Public health concerns 
(reinforced by public and media attention) were addressed with a combination of 
voluntary agreements and an appeal to individual choice.  While policy appeared to 
change, the key policy instruments were never enforced.  Twentieth century policy 
development is characterised by unsuccessful public health attempts to shift the policy 
image of tobacco within government, with little recourse to alternative venues.   
 
If we follow the incremental narrative we see more evidence (from the 1960s) of a 
changing policy image within government, as attention shifted from the economic 
benefits of tobacco to the scientific evidence on illness.  This was increasingly 
accepted by health ministers who took steps to limit the acceptability and prevalence 
of smoking.  However, this was not caused by venue shift (since Parliament was often 
more sympathetic to tobacco interests and influence from the courts was non-existent) 
or to public and media opinion at the time (since these steps were taken in spite of the 
electoral consequences).  A more convincing explanation is that the network was 
never closed to health interests (particularly since the BMA was the Ministry of 
Health’s main ‘client’) and adaptation to new evidence was based on the British 
policy style of ‘bureaucratic accommodation’ (see below).     
 
The dominance narrative is more supportive of a recent punctuation regarding public 
places legislation.  Internal stability was initially maintained by ineffective voluntary 
agreements, even following the election of a Labour Government in 1997 and a 
definitive statement on passive smoking by SCOTH in 1998.  Then, devolution and 
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the increased scope for ‘venue shopping’ led to the prospect of comprehensive 
legislation in all UK countries bar England.   This contributed to increasing levels of 
public attention to passive smoking and shifted the policy image of tobacco (including 
the balance of opinion between freedom and public health).  Almost all of the 
interviews conducted for this study point to rapid public opinion change (following 
the experience of Ireland and Scotland) as a key factor in policy change.  The nature 
of attention limited the governmental response since the appeal to individual freedom 
was no longer consistent with the new policy image.   
 
Yet the incremental narrative qualifies the significance of these external influences.  
As the discussion of ‘above and below’ suggests, while the Department of Health was 
already committed to policy change, it rejected the approach taken by Ireland and the 
rest of the UK.  A degree of mediation is also apparent with public opinion. Curtice 
(2006: 57) suggests that the Scottish Executive went ahead of public opinion with 
comprehensive legislation.  This was helped by the results of a huge consultation 
giving legitimacy to a complete ban (Cairney, forthcoming 2007).  In contrast, the UK 
government followed public opinion to the letter:  
 
Surveys … show 86% of people in favour of workplace restrictions, and a similarly 
substantial majority of people supporting restrictions in restaurants. But when people 
are asked whether smoking should be restricted in pubs the figures fall substantially – 
to around 56% – and when people are asked which sort of restrictions they would 
prefer in pubs only 20% of people choose ‘no smoking allowed anywhere’ and the 
majority tend to be opposed to a complete ban (Cm 6374, 2004: 98). 
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This line did not change when the vast majority of respondents to public consultation 
called for a comprehensive ban (Department of Health, 2005) or when subsequent 
surveys revealed a hardening of public opinion on pubs.  Therefore, external pressure 
alone does not explain the extent of the ban since there is enough scope for 
governments to choose the information they base decisions on.  A comprehensive ban 
was resisted by John Reid when Health Secretary.  When Reid became Secretary of 
State for Defence he was still instrumental in the Cabinet decision to reject a 
compromise (only exempting private clubs) proposed by his successor Patricia 
Hewitt.  Therefore, a full explanation of comprehensive legislation requires analysis 
of venue shift to Westminster.   Further, since (according to policy networks analysis) 
the scope for parliamentary influence tends to be limited, we also need to explain the 
particular circumstances which led to the centrality of Parliament in this case. 
 
Multiple Streams 
Kingdon’s analysis adds an extra factor to explanation.  We have the redefined policy 
problem, we have a solution (an advertising ban; a comprehensive ban on smoking in 
public places) but we do not have the explanation for the adoption of that solution.  
As Kingdon (1984: 165-6) argues, policy change results from the synthesis of all 
three: 
 
Separate streams come together at critical times.  A problem is recognized, a solution 
is developed …, a political change makes it the right time for policy change, and 
potential constraints are not severe … these policy windows, the opportunities for 
action … present themselves and stay open for only short periods. 
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This analysis highlights the detailed, idiosyncratic reasons for policy change.  But 
what factors opened these windows?  In advertising the process is relatively clear, 
with the introduction of an EC directive and a Labour government committed to 
implementing it.  The window eventually opened following Scottish influence, the 
initiation of the bill in the Lords, and parliamentary pressure fuelled by the Ecclestone 
affair.  However, the factors ensuring a comprehensive ban on smoking in public 
places require more discussion.  First, if we follow the dominance narrative 
(highlighting the marginalisation of health ministers) then we see a shift in 
Department of Health influence when John Reid was appointed in June 2003.  Reid 
was a strong Secretary of State (supported by Prime Minister Tony Blair) who made 
public health a priority and ensured that any decision on smoking would be made by 
the Department of Health.  This gave greater prominence to its Chief Medical Officer 
who in the past had been crowded out in tobacco discussions.  Liam Donaldson was 
particularly active in this area, highlighting the issue in annual reports, criticising UK 
policy in comparison with other countries, criticising the socio-economic effects of a 
partial ban and reporting that he came close to resigning following Cabinet’s 
reluctance to opt for a complete ban.
7
 
 
The centrality of the Department of Health accelerated the shifting resources of 
pressure participants.  There were already signs of declining influence of tobacco 
interests, given the reduction of employment and revenue from tobacco. Further, the 
Treasury had become concerned with the broader productivity and health costs of 
tobacco consumption.  This is apparent in Treasury health inequalities policy as part 
of its coordination of prevention strategies across Whitehall departments.  It identified 
smoking as ‘the single most significant causal factor for the socio-economic 
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differences in the incidence of cancer and heart disease’ (HM Treasury and 
Department of Health, 2002).  The old argument about anti-tobacco policies 
victimising the working classes was turned on its head.  Reducing smoking among 
‘manual social groups’ was highlighted by the Treasury as a key means to reduce 
differences in life expectancy.  Therefore the nature of Treasury influence has 
changed and is less likely to undermine tobacco control.  The influence of tobacco 
companies (and the licensed trade) through the DTI was also curtailed following 
Reid’s appointment.  In contrast, the presence and resources of public health groups 
have strengthened.  The BMA and ASH have a stronger campaigning alliance and 
were joined by other organisations.
8
  The role of Cancer Research UK is particularly 
significant since, while this issue marks its first attempt to ‘lobby’ government, it has 
a strong reputation on research and extensive links to the Department of Health, 
Treasury and MPs (interview, CRUK, 2006).  Further, the Chartered Institute of 
Environmental Health argued that it would be costly to enforce a partial smoking ban 
(interview, 2006), while the focus on health and safety ensured a key role for the 
Trades Union Congress.   
 
Second, the background to parliamentary influence was a series of ‘rebellions’ by 
Labour MPs on issues such as education reform and ID cards.  The prospect for 
further revolt (and a Cabinet split) on an issue not high on the government’s agenda 
was key to the decision to allow a free vote (which was crucial given Conservative 
opposition to legislation).  The threat of revolt was furthered by Kevin Barron MP, 
chair of the Health Select Committee.  Barron was instrumental in undermining 
Reid’s insistence that Labour MPs stick to the 2005 manifesto commitments (by 
publicising evidence suggesting the manifesto did not derive from Labour’s 2004 
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National Policy Forum).   He then secured committee time to examine the legislation 
and highlight issues to MPs (including Donaldson’s threat to resign).  He secured an 
agreed line from the committee report and was able to ‘deliver’ a large number of 
MPs willing to vote for a complete ban (interview, Barron, 2006).  Barron and David 
Taylor MP (chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Smoking and Health) then 
met Tony Blair in November 2005 and persuaded him that a free vote would be 
popular and would rescue some leadership credibility within the party (interview, 
Taylor, 2006). 
 
The level of Labour MP support was achieved following an unusual amount of 
pressure participation.  The BMA and ASH targeted MPs directly and through the 
local media, while local doctors applied pressure at the constituency level.  The 
campaign dominated the lobbying time for these groups, all coordinating their efforts 
towards a simple health and safety argument – that if an MP accepted the argument on 
the health of workers in restaurants it could not ignore the health of workers in bars 
and clubs.  This was bolstered by the success in Ireland (Barron and Taylor had 
organised MP visits) and the prospect of full bans in the rest of the UK.  The result 
was an overwhelming majority who voted against John Reid’s exemptions and for 
comprehensive legislation (Cowley and Stuart, 2006).   
 
Are These Results Generalisable? 
The reliance on idiosyncratic reasons for policy change leads to the problem of 
generalisability.  There are a number of reasons to suggest that these findings are not 
reflected widely in British Politics.  First, the level of MP interest is unusual and we 
should be cautious about making broad conclusions about parliamentary influence 
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during an extended period of Labour rebellion (Cowley, 2006: 55).   Second, the 
nature of pressure politics was unusual.
9
  Tobacco took up a disproportionate amount 
of BMA time and marked a departure in strategy by cancer charities (interviews, 
BMA and CRUK, 2006).  The case-study also highlights the success of an ‘open 
strategy’, or maintaining multiple channels of access to government, parliament and 
the public (Whitely and Winyard, 1987: 86-7).   This contrasts with the policy 
communities literature stressing insulated contacts between government and groups 
who agree to ‘sell’ the results of negotiations regardless of the level of disagreement. 
(Jordan and Richardson, 1987; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992).  The traditional ‘British 
policy style’ was to seek consensus through ‘bureaucratic accommodation’ removed 
from the glare of public attention.  This process often took place between conflicting 
groups following the “realization that both sides could ‘win’” (Jordan and Richardson, 
1981: 80-1; Jordan and Maloney, 1997: 578; Cairney 2006).  ASH was successful 
despite flouting these rules, but in this case the Department of Health was sympathetic 
and ASH’s role was complementary (tending to criticise the effects of tobacco and the 
industry rather than government).  In cases with clearer opposition to government 
policy the results are different.  Groups in the voluntary sector know that criticism 
affects their funding and status within the network; education unions are only 
included in negotiations on workforce issues if they sign the ‘social partnership’ 
prohibiting public criticism; and an open strategy against the Mental Health Bill led to 
the loss of legislation (in 2006) rather than a change in policy.  Third, policy transfer 
in England based on pressure from the rest of the UK is unusual.  In most cases (and 
health, housing and higher education in particular) the pressure flows in the opposite 
direction.  Fourth, the influence of the EU varies, from direct and strong in 
agricultural and environmental policy, to indirect and variable in health and 
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education.  Therefore, the value of each model of policy change is likely to vary by 
case study.  This reinforces the value of a multiple lenses approach. 
 
Conclusion 
UK tobacco policy appears to be characterised by rapid change following long periods 
of stability.  To an extent we can explain stability with reference to post-war socio-
economic conditions: tobacco was an important source of jobs and revenue, smoking 
prevalence was high and anti-smoking legislation was perceived to be unpopular.  
However, there is disagreement about the effect this had on policy.  The dominance 
narrative suggests that a producer dominated policy network was formed around the 
definition of tobacco as an economic issue.  Public health interests were excluded 
from the core network.  Although the evidence linking smoking to illness was 
increasingly accepted within government, the policy response was minimal.  The 
definition of smoking as an issue of choice ensured that voluntary agreements (rarely 
enforced) were chosen over legislation.  The incremental narrative suggests that the 
exclusion of science and medicine was exaggerated.  Policy change was incremental 
but on a clear path towards tobacco control. While the policy response to advertising 
and public places was often limited, it signalled that legislation would follow if self-
regulation failed.   
 
The narratives serve two crucial functions in the explanation of policy change.  First, 
they promote clarity on the extent and meaning of change. The dominance narrative 
describes recent legislation as a sea change in policy and a challenge to vested 
interests and inertia in government.  This is challenged by the incremental narrative 
which sees legislation as a logical progression of policy.  Second, this discussion is 
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crucial since the nature of change determines the value of explanatory models.   
Models which highlight the influence of external factors are most impressive if we 
identify long-term internal stability.  If the UK was already on a clear path towards 
tobacco control then their value is less clear. 
 
The extent to which tobacco advertising legislation was caused by events above-and-
below varies by narrative.  There is evidence of multi-level governance in the 
dispersal of power to the EU and Scotland, with venue shift producing polices that 
influenced the UK.  The need to implement an EU Directive coupled with pressure 
from Scotland suggests that a recalcitrant UK government was coerced into action.  
However, since Scottish activity did not particularly register in Westminster and the 
UK’s legislation went beyond EU requirements, there is a high degree of voluntary 
transfer consistent with the preferred incremental approach.  This argument is clearer 
with public places in which there is little EU pressure. While the prospect of a 
comprehensive ban in the rest of the UK was embarrassing and the evidence from 
Ireland was impressive, the UK government drew on a wider international evidence 
base which was more of a fit with its approach.   
 
Policy networks analysis suggests that while socio-economic shifts strengthen public 
health interests, policy change is not inevitable.  With the ACF we see pro-tobacco 
weakened, but the long-term propensity of the policy broker to accept its core 
argument (economy and freedom over health) explains why change was limited.  In 
the face of external shocks, pro-tobacco was willing to adapt to maintain its 
dominance, and has done so successfully for decades.  However, the ACF struggles to 
explain significant change as well as it explains stability.  Change comes from 
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external shocks but also constitutional pressures, which to the ACF are sources of 
stability.  The lesson from MLG is that the fluid constitutional position is as much a 
source of change, with venue shift often a key determinant of government policy.  
 
With punctuated equilibrium we explain stability with reference to a dominant policy 
image within a policy monopoly.  Change results from a challenge to that image, 
often by appealing to venues outside of the policy monopoly, to widen participation 
and focus attention on different aspects of the policy problem.  However, it is difficult 
to identify this punctuation in post-war UK tobacco.  The dominance narrative 
suggests that policy change was minimal and there were few influential venues 
outside government.  While the incremental narrative points to a shift of attention and 
problem definition within government, this was despite public opinion and the lack of 
alternative venues.  Rather, the policy network was never closed to health interests 
and policy changed through the normal process of bureaucratic accommodation.  The 
dominance narrative is more sympathetic to the idea of a more recent punctuation 
caused by rising attention to passive smoking.  By the early 2000s the policy 
environment had changed, with devolution providing scope for external influence.   
Public attention to the effects of passive smoking (and policy in the rest of the UK) is 
cited by most interviewees as a key reason for policy change.  This new image of 
tobacco was crucial since it limited the choices available to government.   However, 
the incremental narrative points to the mediation of public pressure.  The evidence 
suggests that while public opinion was changing quickly from 2004, the UK 
government line did not.   
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In all cases, a discussion of the unusual significance of venue shift to Westminster is 
necessary to fully explain the adoption of comprehensive legislation.  This depended 
on a series of events which came together at the right time – rapid shifts of public 
opinion; high levels of pressure participant activity; a strong Health Secretary; and 
previous Labour rebellions ensuring a free vote.  Without the latter, the Labour whip 
combined with Conservative opposition to legislation would have ensured the more 
limited government policy.   
 
This reliance on idiosyncratic explanation may undermine generalisability and the 
results of this case study have qualified relevance to the study of UK public policy as 
a whole.  However, variations by policy sector and sub-sector over time are a 
permanent feature of policy analysis. This variation affects the value of different 
models of policy change and therefore reinforces the significance of a multiple lenses 
approach.    
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1
 This article draws on interviews with MPs, civil servants and pressure participants in tobacco policy.  
Thanks to Professor Rob Baggott, Professor Grant Jordan and three anonymous referees for comments 
on an earlier draft. 
2
 Tobacco Manufacturer’s Advisory Committee; Tobacco Distributors’ Advisory Committee. 
3
 Note plans to raise the legal age to 18 – Department of Health (2006). 
4
 Similar frustration was expressed in interviews by ASH, the BMA and the Chartered Institute for 
Environmental Health. 
5
 See http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/  
6
 Office of National Statistics Smoking-related behaviour 
and attitudes, 2005 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_health/Smoking2005.pdf  
7
 Guardian 24.11.05 ‘Chief medical officer nearly quit over smoking ban’ 
http://society.guardian.co.uk/health/news/0,8363,1649787,00.html  
8
 See http://www.smokefreeaction.org.uk/  
9
 These points are informed by interviews (200) conducted as part of a study into policy communities 
in Scotland (by Professor Michael Keating under the ESRC Devolution Programme), Wales and 
England (by Cairney, funded by the University of Aberdeen). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Contrasting Narratives of Tobacco Policy Change 
 Dominance Narrative Incremental Narrative 
Post-war policy change 
(until the early 2000s) 
was: 
Limited; minimal changes 
mediated and exaggerated 
by the tobacco industry 
Significant, with gradual 
steps up to the 1970s 
accelerated from the 1980s  
The tobacco policy 
network was relatively: 
Closed and dominated by 
tobacco interests 
Open to health and 
scientific interests 
Voluntary agreements on 
tobacco represent: 
The appearance of policy 
change without actual 
enforcement 
A profound signal of 
intent, with legislation to 
follow if unsuccessful 
The move from a 
Conservative to Labour 
government in 1997: 
Demonstrates inertia and 
the difference between 
commitments made in 
opposition and actions 
when in government  
Represents a greater 
commitment to, and 
acceleration of, tobacco 
control  
Recent legislation 
represents: 
A sea-change in policy and 
a challenge to vested 
interests and inertia in 
government 
A logical progression, 
consistent with existing 
policies 
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